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THE COSTS OF HARMONIZATION:  
THE EMBRACE OF AN INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT 
REGIME IN GOLAN V. HOLDER 
 
Angelie Thomas* 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
A copyright creates exclusive rights to a literary and artistic 
work that is original.1  Copyrights are territorial by nature:2 there is 
no grant of copyright protection that extends worldwide. 3 
Nevertheless, an international copyright regime has developed, 
consisting of bilateral copyright treaties and multilateral copyright 
conventions that now protect the expression of ideas far beyond 
their country of origin.4   
The first accord to shape the foundation of this 
international copyright regime was the 1886 Berne Convention for 
the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (“Berne 
Convention”). 5   Under the Berne Convention, nationals of a 
member country enjoy copyright protection beyond their nation’s 
                                       
* J.D. Candidate, St. John’s University School of Law, Class of 2014. 
1 See PAUL GOLDSTEIN & BERNT HUGENHOLTZ, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT: 
PRINCIPLES, LAW AND PRACTICE 4 (2d ed. 2010). These exclusive rights 
generally include the right to reproduce, distribute, publicly perform, broadcast, 
and otherwise communicate a work to the public, id. 
2 Id. at 97. Under the territoriality principle, copyright exists under the laws of 
individual countries and ends at their borders. This principle addresses two 
interests: national sovereignty and the promotion of international commerce by 
securing reasonable investment expectations, id. at 95. 
3 See Jon Baumgarten, Primer on the Principles of International Copyright, in 
FOURTH ANNUAL U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE SPEAKS: CONTEMPORARY 
COPYRIGHT AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ISSUES 470, 471 (1992) (arguing that 
the term “international copyright” is a misnomer because there is no existing 
single code governing copyright protection across national borders). 
4 See Jane C. Ginsburg, Ownership of Electronic Rights and the Private Int’l 
Law of Copyright, 22 Colum.-VLA J.L. & Arts 165, 169 (1998) (describing the 
international copyright regime as a collection of copyrights by virtue of bilateral 
and multilateral treaties); see also Lynn Carino, Note, Creative Technology, Ltd. 
v. Aztech System Pte, Ltd.: The Ninth Circuit Sends a United States Copyright 
Infringement Case to Singapore on a Motion of Forum Non Conveniens, 41 
VILL. L. REV. 325, 330 (1996). 
5 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 
1886, revised at Paris, July 24, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 1341, 828 U.N.T.S. 221. 
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borders.6  Article 18 of the Berne Convention requires countries to 
protect the works of other member States unless the works’ 
copyright term has expired in the country where protection was 
claimed or the country of origin.7  The United States only joined 
the Convention in 1989, having formerly resisted the forces of 
international harmonization.8  Even after joining Berne, Congress 
adopted a minimalist approach to the copyright regime, making 
only those changes to American copyright law that were explicitly 
required under the treaty’s provisions.9  It offered no protection to 
any foreign work that was in the public domain in the United 
States.  Thus, while the United States declared its compliance with 
Berne, it never addressed or enacted legislation to implement 
Article 18 of the Convention.10 
                                       
6 See id. at art. 1 (providing that the countries to which the Berne Convention 
applies “constitute a Union for the protection of the rights of authors in their 
literary and artistic works”); see also id. at art. 3 (stating that the protection of 
the Convention applies to “(a) authors who are nationals of one of the countries 
of the Union, for their works, whether published or not” and “(b) authors who 
are not nationals of one of the countries of the Union, for their works first 
published in one of those countries, or simultaneously in a country outside the 
Union and in a country of the Union”). 
7 See id. at art. 18. Article 18 establishes that the Berne Convention applies to 
“works which at the moment of its coming into force, ha[d] not yet fallen into 
the public domain in the country of origin through the expiry of the term of 
protection,” id. Article 18 states further that “if… through the expiry of the term 
of protection which was previously granted, a work has fallen into the public 
domain of the country where protection is claimed,” the work will not be 
protected, id. 
8 See PAUL E. GELLER, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE § 5 
(2012); see also Edward L. Carter, Harmonization of Copyright Law In 
Response To Technological Change: Lessons From Europe About Fair Use And 
Free Expression, 30 U. LA VERNE L. REV. 312, 316 (2009).  
9 See H.R. REP. NO. 100-609, at 52 (1988); see also Carter, supra note 8, at 316 
(noting that under the Berne Convention the United States was required to 
recognize the moral rights of authors, but that the U.S. Congress skirted this 
requirement by only recognizing moral rights in a very limited way for certain 
visual artists).  
10 See S. REP. NO. 103-412 at 225 (1994). The Berne Convention was generally 
viewed as being non-self-executing. It thus required domestic legislation to 
implement the treaty in the United States. By passing the 1988 Berne 
implementation amendments, Congress left no doubt of its view that the Berne 
Convention was not self-executing: the amendments provide that “any country 
party to this convention undertakes to adopt, in accordance with its constitution, 
the measures necessary to ensure the application of this Convention,” see PAUL 
GOLDSTEIN, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT: PRINCIPLES, LAW AND PRACTICE 15 
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 In 1994, however, the backdrop changed.  The Agreement 
on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(“TRIPS”) mandated an implementation of the first twenty-one 
articles of the Berne Convention. 11  TRIPS enforced 
the harmonization effort by tying intellectual property protection to 
trade: nations that failed to comply with TRIPS would be subject 
to international trade sanctions. 12   In response to the TRIPS 
requirement, Congress enacted § 514 of the Uruguay Round 
Agreements Act (URAA), belatedly granting certain foreign works 
in the public domain the copyright protection that they would have 
enjoyed if the United States had fully complied with its obligations 
under the Berne Convention in 1989.13  
 Recently, in Golan v. Holder,14 the Supreme Court of the 
United States reviewed the constitutionality of the URAA § 514 
enactment.  Petitioners were orchestra conductors, musicians, and 
publishers who formerly had free access to works that § 514 
removed from the public domain. 15   They argued that the 
retroactive copyright restorations of the URAA violated the 
Constitution, exceeding Congressional authority under the 
Copyright Clause and transgressing First Amendment limitations.16  
The Court, however, disagreed with the plaintiffs, and held 
that § 514 of the URAA neither contravened constitutional 
limitations placed on Congress nor deviated from First 
Amendment principles.17  It found that because § 514 merely 
                                                                                      
& n.19 (1st ed. 2001) (describing self-executing and non-self-executing treaties 
in the context of the Berne Convention).  
11 See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 
9, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization, Annex 1C, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS—RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY 
ROUND vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) (stating that “members shall comply with 
Articles 1 through 21 of the Berne Convention”). 
12 See Carter, supra note 8, at 315. 
13 See Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, sec. 514, § 104A, 
108 Stat. 4809, 4976-81 (1994) (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 104A, 109(a) (2011)). 
14 Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 873 (2012). 
15 Id. at 878. Prior to the URAA enactment, each petitioner utilized or performed 
works by foreign artists in the public domain. Lawrence Golan in particular 
performed and taught works by foreign composers including Dmitri 
Shostakovich and Igor Stravinsky, see id. Following the enactment, petitioners 
were either prevented from using these works or were required to pay higher 
licensing fees that were often cost-prohibitive. See Golan v. Gonzalez, 501 F.3d 
1179, 1182 (10th Cir. Colo. 2007).  
16 See Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 883. 
17 Id. at 878. 
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continued the trend toward a harmonized copyright regime,18 and 
there was no reason to reject Congress’s rational judgment that 
adherence to the Berne Convention would serve the objectives of 
the Copyright Clause. 19   Congress had determined that U.S. 
interests were best served by full participation in the dominant 
system of international copyright protection. 20   The Court 
maintained that its obligation was not to determine whether this 
decision was wise, but whether it was constitutional.21  
 Though the Court was correct in limiting its decision to a 
constitutional analysis, Golan nevertheless affirms a harmonization 
of copyright that the United States had previously rejected for two 
centuries.  The Court adopted a deferential approach to copyright 
legislation, such that challenges to the constitutionality of future 
expansions to copyright protection are unlikely to succeed.22  This 
comment will argue that the Court failed to consider the costs of 
moving toward an international copyright regime.  Part A will 
discuss how such a regime can impoverish developing nations in 
their effort to comply with international copyright requirements 
that poorly support their local conditions.  Part B will show how 
the international right to free expression can be abridged by a 
harmonized copyright system.  Part C will suggest that 
diversification of copyright law may provide the better alternative. 
 
I. The Costs of Harmonization to Developing Countries 
 
The danger of creating a harmonized international 
copyright regime stems from the inherent distinctions between 
                                       
18 Id. The Court explained that by fully implementing the Berne Convention, 
Congress ensured that both foreign and domestic works would be governed by 
the same legal regime, id. at 893 (noting that before the United States joined 
Berne, domestic works were protected under U.S. statutes and bilateral 
international agreements, while many foreign works were available royalty-free 
at an artificially low cost). 
19 Id. (finding that the decision to implement URAA § 514 was well within the 
power of the political branches). 
20 Id. These interests included ensuring compliance with international 
obligations, securing greater protection for U.S. authors abroad, and remedying 
unequal treatment of foreign authors, id. at 894.  
21 Id. (declaring that it was the Court’s duty to determine whether the action 
Congress took exceeded any constitutional limitations). 
22 See Mary LaFrance, Emerging Issues, Supreme Court's Decision to Uphold 
the Constitutionality of Copyright Restoration: Golan v. Holder, 2012 U.S. 
LEXIS 907, 2012 EMERGING ISSUES 6197 (Jan. 31, 2012). 
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developed nations and developing nations.  The original Western 
intellectual property system became universal because of the 
economic and military support backing it, not because it embodied 
universal values.23  Thus, a “one size fits all” copyright regime 
with a global application may not be appropriate.24   
The uniformity of copyright legislation in developing 
countries is evidenced by their use of text copied exactly from the 
treaty language of the Berne Convention, without the slight 
deviation seen in the copyright laws of most developed nations. 
This suggests that these laws were created without attention to the 
distinct cultural interests, informational constraints, and economic 
realities of each country.25  An international copyright system that 
disregards these significant differences severely disadvantages 
developing nations and has various consequences in each country.  
Developing nations face cultural and educational barriers after the 
adoption of such programs.  Furthermore, there are significant 
administrative costs involved in implementing the universal 
system. 
 
A. The Inhibition of Cultural Progress 
 
A nation’s system of copyright embodies its priorities in 
establishing a unique cultural environment.26  These priorities vary 
widely among countries with different social traditions.27  The 
                                       
23 See Peter K. Yu, Intellectual Property at a Crossroads: The Use of the Past in 
Intellectual Property Jurisprudence: Currents and Crosscurrents in the 
International Intellectual Property Regime, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 323, 391 
(2004). 
24 See id. 
25 See Ruth L. Okediji, The International Copyright System: Limitations, 
Exceptions and Public Interest Considerations for Developing Countries,  
UNCTAD - ICTSD Project on IPRs and Sustainable Development 30 (2006), 
http://www.iprsonline.org/resources/docs/Okediji%20%20Copyright%20and%2
0DC%20-%20Blue%2015.pdf (“[T]he uniformity of the limitations and 
exceptions evident in the legislation of many developing countries suggests that 
most of these laws were modeled on the Berne Convention without 
particularized attention to unique social interests, institutional constraints and/or 
political realities of each country.”). 
26 See Matt Jackson, Harmony Or Discord? The Pressure Toward Conformity In 
International Copyright, 43 IDEA 607, 640 (2003) (explaining how copyright 
law is an instrument of cultural and information policy). 
27 There are some nations, such as France and Germany, that place a heavier 
emphasis on the "moral rights" of authors, see Jackson, supra note 26, at 640.  
Other nations, like the United States, concentrate on the utilitarian objective of 
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priorities of developed nations are often centered around free 
market principles, individual rights, and the concept that profits are 
the appropriate reward for the labor applied to creative 
endeavors. 28   Such beliefs result in laws that provide strong 
copyright protection.  By contrast, nations built on foundations of 
Confucianism, Buddhism, and Islam are more communally 
oriented.29   These beliefs indicate that knowledge and wealth 
should be shared within society and distributed equally, 30 
suggesting the creation of copyright laws with limitations and 
exceptions for the public interest.  By mandating the adoption of a 
universal system representing solely the priorities of developed 
nations, less-developed countries are deprived of the ability to 
tailor their copyright system to local beliefs.31  
Countries with growing entertainment industries often 
stand to suffer most from an ill-fitting international copyright 
system.  Senegal, for example, seeks to develop a music industry to 
diversify its economic base and strengthen the cultural solidarity of 
the country, looking to the city of Nashville for inspiration.32 
Lebanon has an entertainment industry ready to explode onto the 
international arena.33  In such countries, certain genres of works 
and modes of expression purposely incorporate, reproduce, or 
transform pre-existing works.34  Facilitating access to protected 
works becomes vital to promoting ongoing creative activity, 
progress and growth.35  A harmonized copyright regime blocks 
                                                                                      
promoting the production of creative works, id. (asserting that these differences 
contribute to a richer diversity of cultural products).  
28  See id. at 641 (citing Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The Development and 
Incorporation of International Norms in the Formation of Copyright Law, 62 
OHIO ST. L.J. 733, 740 (2001)). 
29 See id. at 641–42 (citing Richard E. Vaughan, Defining Terms in Intellectual 
Property Protection Debate: Are the North and South Arguing Past Each Other 
When They Say “Property”? A Lockean, Confucian, and Islamic Comparison, 2 
ILSA J. INT’L. & COMP. L. 307, 321 (1996). 
30 See id. at 641.  
31  See Peter K. Yu, International Lawmaking In The New Millennium: An 
Introduction, 10 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1, 3 (2002). 
32 See Lauren Loew, Note, Creative Industries in Developing Countries and 
Intellectual Property Protection, 9 VAND. J ENT. & TECH L. 171, 173 (2006). 
33 See id. 
34 See Okediji, supra note 25, at x. Modern examples include the practice of 
“sampling” in the music industry, narrative styles in literature and creative 
writing, and programming software for interoperability, id. 
35 See id. at x–xi. 
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access to these works and thus inhibits cultural progress that free 
access would otherwise encourage.  
 
B. A Barrier to Information and Educational Access 
 
The harmonization of copyright law can result in the loss of 
national autonomy, as it not only prevents nations from pursuing 
their own domestic cultural agendas,36 but also sacrifices diverse 
perspectives on the role of information in society.37   This is 
particularly the case in developing countries’ access to educational 
materials.  
The materials most often affected by copyright in these 
countries are textbooks, journals, course packs and information 
that can be found in libraries.38  Copyright holders control the 
photocopying, reprinting, distributing of such materials.39  They 
also have the right to prohibit parallel importation of educational 
materials from cheaper sources.40  For example, foreign publishers 
supplying the book market in Thailand prohibit parallel 
importation of cheaper books from China or India.41  Books in 
Thailand also cannot be exported to other nations.42  In South 
Africa, medical personnel who wish to distribute copyrighted 
material about HIV/ AIDS to students and patients are required to 
pay royalty fees, thereby severely restricting the circulation of such 
information.43  Restrictions on making copies of protected material 
and the high costs of royalties for reproducing this material—
consequences that result from an increasingly harmonized 
                                       
36 See Jackson, supra note 26, at 640. 
37 See id. at 643 (describing the consequences of harmonization of copyright 
laws). 
38  See SUSAN STRBA, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW AND ACCESS TO 
EDUCATION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 29 (2012) (explaining the extensive 
rights of the copyright holders in developed countries). 
39 See id. (noting also that publishers do not often grant licenses to reprint their 
books). 
40 See id.; see also Annual Meeting of the International Association for the 
Advancement of Teaching and Research in Intellectual Property, July 7–9, 1999, 
Parallel Imports and International Trade at 1, ATRIP/GVA/99/6 (explaining 
that the term “parallel importation” refers to goods produced and sold legally, 
and subsequently exported). 
41 See STRBA, supra note 38, at 29. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. at 30. 
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copyright regime—thus affect the educational goals of developing 
countries.44  
 
C. Administrative Costs of Compliance 
 
In addition, harmonization increases the financial burden 
on developing nations, as they must bear the administrative cost of 
compliance.45  Developing countries are most often users, not 
producers, of copyrighted materials; as a result, they import a 
majority of their publications.  These imported books are more 
expensive than locally reproduced books. 46   Furthermore, the 
materials in these works are reprinted or adapted from publishers 
in industrialized countries.  The administrative costs involved in 
obtaining permission from these rights owners, who are mainly 
multinational companies from developed countries, are high.47  For 
example, in Thailand, between 10% and 60% of the price of a book 
can be the result of copyright protection alone.48  This increase in 
cost serves as a prohibitive barrier to the general population, where 
an average income household may pay up to 6% of its monthly 
income for just one textbook. 49   Thus, the harmonization of 
international copyright severely curtails the ability of developing 
nations to cope with the price of a universal system.  
 
II. The Effects of Harmonization on the International Right to 
Free Expression 
 
In Golan v. Holder, the Court scrutinized URAA § 514 
under domestic freedom of speech principles.50  However, the 
Court’s decision affects (or extends to) international principles of 
freedom of expression.  
The international principle of freedom of expression is set 
forth in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.51  Through its 
                                       
44 Id.  
45 See Peter K. Yu, TRIPS and its Achilles’ Heel, 18 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 479, 488 
(2011). 
46 See STRBA, supra note 38, at 30–31. 
47 See id. at 30. 
48 Id. at 31. 
49 Id. at 30–31. 
50 See Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 890.  
51 See G.A. Res. 217 art. III, U.N. Doc. A/810, art. 19, at 71 (1948) ("Everyone 
has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom 
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appearance in various successive treaties, the principle has become 
a fundamental precept of customary international law.52  Entwined 
in this principle is the concept that free speech is often best served 
by the literal copying of existing expression.53  Effective criticism, 
parody, artistic expression, and news reporting often gain 
considerable force by their literal reference to existing work.54  
Copyright law qualifies the free speech principle that a 
speaker is entitled to choose how he communicates an idea, by 
proscribing the use of language and other material employed by a 
rightsholder. 55   This effectively places a tax on the flow of 
information.  Therefore, an overly broad set of copyright owner 
rights can constrain public access to existing expression and hinder 
creative reformulations of that expression, thereby infringing upon 
the international right to free expression.56  
The international right to free expression encourages 
limitations of copyright in order to promote the free flow of 
                                                                                      
to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart 
information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers"). The 
principle of freedom of expression is also set forth in the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). See International Convention on Civil 
and Political Rights, adopted Dec. 16, 1966, art. 19(2), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 6 
I.L.M. 368 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976). 
52 See Neil W. Netanel, The Digital Agenda of the World Intellectual Property 
Organization: Comment: The Next Round: The Impact Of The WIPO Copyright 
Treaty On TRIPS Dispute Settlement, 37 VA. J. INT'L L. 441, 476 (1997); see 
also Thomas M. Franck, Note, The Emerging Right to Democratic 
Governance, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 46, 61–62 (1992) (noting that the overwhelming 
support behind the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the prestige 
accrued to it in succeeding years has made it a customary rule of state 
obligation).  
53 See Neil W. Netanel, Asserting Copyright’s Democratic Principles in the 
Global Arena, 51 VAND. L. REV. 217, 299 (1998). 
54 See id. (suggesting that literal copying is often more effective than the mere 
reformulation of ideas or information). Copying is also a cheaper method of 
conveying ideas or information than the process of creating a whole new work, 
see id. Copying expression is thus highly conducive to making information 
available to those who might not otherwise afford access, a particular concern in 
developing countries, see id.  
55  See COPYRIGHT AND FREE SPEECH 24 (Jonathan Griffiths & Uma 
Suthersanen, eds., 2005 (discussing how freedom of speech concerns the form of 
speech as well as its contents).  
56 See Netanel, supra note 52, at 476 (suggesting that while some degree of 
copyright protection provides important incentive for the dissemination of 
creative expression, an overly maximist reading of the copyright provisions of 
TRIPS can hinder that same dissemination). 
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information.57  As expanded copyright gradually eliminates these 
restrictions, the Golan Court’s embrace of a harmonized 
international copyright system will likely have a global effect on 
transformative uses of protected works.58   
 
III. Considering the Alternative of Diversification  
 
A universal copyright system can certainly seem appealing: 
it promotes efficiency, reduces negotiation costs, and enhances 
international stability.59  However, as the costs of harmonization 
far outweigh these benefits and the consequences of a universal 
international copyright regime suggest that diversification may 
provide the better solution.  
Diversification of copyright laws would allow countries to 
develop protections that are commensurate with their particular 
needs and differences, instead of applying a “one size fits all” 
solution that creates friction with local conditions.60  Additionally, 
as diversification facilitates jurisdictional competition that 
safeguards against governmental inefficiency and abuse, and 
makes copyright laws more accountable to local populations.61  
 Tailoring copyright laws appropriately will require research 
on nations’ domestic industries and analyses by experts of how 
best to maximize a country’s potential. 62   It will require 
recognition of the underlying differences between nations.  For 
countries like India or China, with stronger technological capacity, 
the needs will be different than a country in sub-Saharan Africa.63  
                                       
57 See id. 
58 See Neil W. Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE 
L.J. 283, 296 (1996). 
59 See Yu, supra note 23, at 382–83. 
60 See id. at 383.  
61 See id. 
62  See COMMISSION ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, INTEGRATING 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT POLICY 105 (2002) 
(U.K.), available at http://www.iprcommission.org/papers/pdfs/finalreport/ 
CIPRfullfinal.pdf (stating that the implementation of international copyright 
standards in the developing world must be undertaken with a proper 
appreciation of their crucial importance for social and economic development); 
see also Loew, supra note 32, at 197.  
63  See COMMISSION ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, INTEGRATING 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT POLICY, supra note 62, at 
104 (indicating that different measures may be more or less important in 
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For those developing countries that have acquired significant 
technological and innovative capabilities, a system of weaker 
forms of copyright protection is necessary in the formative period 
of their economic development.64  This is only possible if these 
countries are not forced to comply with an international system 
that provides  much stronger copyright protection.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
While many of the limitations and exceptions in copyright 
law are explicitly addressed through legislation, the actual 
substance and scope of the copyright system is often determined by 
courts in the course of adjudication.65  Thus, the Court’s deference 
to a harmonized international copyright regime in Golan v. Holder, 
and its failure to consider the international costs may have a 
broader impact than the Court realized.  The effect of 
harmonization on the legal systems of developing nations, and on 
international principles of freedom of expression, may ultimately 
affect the international copyright regime’s ability to sustain itself 
in the long term.   
 
                                                                                      
meeting the specific needs in individual countries); see also Loew, supra note 
32, at 197. 
64  See COMMISSION ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, INTEGRATING 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT POLICY, supra note 62, at 
1. 
65 OKEDIJI, supra note 25, at 20.  
